Beschreibung
Interactions between suppliers and buyers often face some asymmetric information. This holds potential for efficiency losses in markets that might be overcome by sharing information. In an Ultimatum Game context, we experimentally examines the strategic choice of communication with different reliability and its effects on efficiency and payoff distributions. We replicate previous findings that asymmetric information results in efficiency losses, and show that these losses affect both the informed and the uninformed parties. Communication leads to an improvement of the situation. However, reliable communication does not reach its full potential while cheap-talk communication also has an impact. Communication effects are asymmetric in that mostly proposers benefit from communication, be they informed or uninformed.| Zeitraum | 6 Sept. 2017 → 9 Sept. 2017 |
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| Ereignistitel | ESA European Meeting |
| Veranstaltungstyp | Keine Angaben |
| Bekanntheitsgrad | National |