BeschreibungThis paper examines whether people distort beliefs about third parties – such as the ability of scientists to offset one’s environmental impact – to excuse self interested behavior. I set up a lab experiment in which dictators decide how much money to take, with the success of a third party in solving a puzzle determining whether the money comes from passive participants or another source. The experiment exogenously varies whether it is the success or the failure of the third party that results in taking the chosen amount from passive participants. After participants decide the amount, they report their beliefs about the success of the third party. I find that the proportion of participants believing in the success of the third party is 13 percentage points higher when the success of the third party results in taking the money from a different source. With monetary incentives for correct beliefs, this effect goes down to 6 percentage points and becomes insignificant. This means that the presence of a third party might result in even more self-interested behavior than it has been previously thought.
|Zeitraum||28 Sept. 2018 → 29 Sept. 2018|
|Ereignistitel||13th Nordic conference on Behavioural and Experimental Economics|