Reputation and the evolution of private property rights

Aktivität: VortragWissenschaftlicher Vortrag (Science-to-Science)

Beschreibung

Private property rights existed long before formal laws and institutional rights had been established. They have been explained as an equilibrium of the Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game borrowed from biological models of animal territoriality. But in these models so-called anti-private-property equilibria exist which are not observed in the real world. We suggest a new evolutionary game-theoretic approach in which the interaction between the possessor of a valuable object and a potential taker is modeled as a symmetrized game of entry-deterrence where the taker has the additional option to obtain costly information on the possessor's past reactions to attempts of taking her object. Resisting these attempts, even though not credible in the one-shot interaction, allows possessors to gain a reputation of toughness which might deter such attempts in the future. For low information costs and under best-response dynamics the anti-private-property equilibrium's basin of attraction is quite small, while the private-property equilibrium component is asymptotically stable with a large basin of attraction. We use agent-based simulations to show that these results are qualitatively robust to the introduction of more realistic features of the underlying dynamics.
Zeitraum4 Okt. 2019
EreignistitelWorkshop on Evolutionary Game Theory
VeranstaltungstypKeine Angaben
BekanntheitsgradNational

Österreichische Systematik der Wissenschaftszweige (ÖFOS)

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