BeschreibungEven if Art 10 ECHR protects freedom of expression as freedom to impart information and ideas while, for example, the First Amendment to the US Constitution only grants freedom of speech, it would be quite naïve to come to the conclusion that therefore the ECHR offers protection to a wider array of modes of expression than the US Constitution which seems to focus on the spoken or written word. Speech (in any free speech clause) obviously means more than just to talk and to write. And a great multitude of cases protecting non-verbal modes of expression under free speech clauses gives examples whatever this more might be. Still, as a commentator once remarked: a right to free speech evidently does not contain a right to commit murder, to drive a car in a pedestrian zone, or to sell heroin; a point which seems superfluous to make if we consider acts quite naturally perceived as communicative. Surely, drawing a cartoon is to be seen as a suitable means to criticize a certain politician s agenda. But what if the means chosen is a less traditional one? What if the critic instead of writing Letters to the Editor decides to (literally) throw pie (or worse) at the politician while she is holding a press conference? Is Monty Python s Silly Walk protected expression? And does sitting at a Starbucks in a legally relevant manner imply that those at the table do recommend the coffee served there? And on the other hand: is verbal expression per se protected under free speech clauses? May a robber rely on having exercised a right, threatening the victim? And does Anti-Trust legislation truly interfere with free speech?
|Zeitraum||9 Okt. 2014|
|Ereignistitel||Gesprächskreis Menschenrechte - Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht|
Österreichische Systematik der Wissenschaftszweige (ÖFOS)
- 505011 Menschenrechte
- 603117 Rechtsphilosophie