We show that in the aftermath of the financial crisis underpricing of corporate bonds increases because underwriters systematically place bonds to relationship investors. We argue that the post-crisis decrease in inventory-carrying capacities incentivizes underwriters to secure future intermediation by outsourcing bonds to related investors, who require in exchange increased underpricing. We isolate the strength of underwriter-investor relations by employing a novel empirical identification strategy based on institutional investors’ past holdings of underwriters’ own bonds. The relationship channel fully captures the increase in underpricing from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period. Furthermore, it shows that relationship investors are net sellers of newly issued bonds in the post-crisis period. The results are informative about implications of post-crisis regulation.
11 Okt. 2017 → 14 Okt. 2017
FMA Conference Boston
Österreichische Systematik der Wissenschaftszweige (ÖFOS)