Projektdetails
Beschreibung
Previous research demonstrates that delayed feedback in Tax Evasion Games (TEGs) increases tax compliance but decreases perceived fairness, challenging the notion that fairness fosters trust and compliance within tax systems. Our study introduces an 'intermediate feedback' condition to traditional TEGs to explore the effects of feedback timing on tax compliance and perceived fairness. Conducting an incentivized online experiment with 300 participants, we manipulate feedback timing, tax rates, audit probabilities, and fine rates over 24 rounds. In the novel intermediate feedback condition, participants receive information on their audits halfway through the TEG, compared to information after each round or just in a summary after the last round. We test whether compliance in the intermediate condition decreases after the audit information halfway through the TEG, potentially indicating a biased perception of audit probability as main cause for the adverse effect of delayed feedback. Additionally, we explore the relationship between fairness perceptions and compliance across conditions. The study aims to provide insights into the optimal levels of audit information for fostering tax compliance and fairness perceptions, potentially informing tax administration and policymaking. Our findings contribute to improving the external validity of TEGs and understanding the dynamics of tax compliance behavior.
Status | Nicht begonnen |
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