A simulation study of managerial compensation

Brian Sallans, Alexander Pfister, Georg Dorffner

Publikation: Working/Discussion PaperWU Working Paper

Abstract

A computational economics model of managerial compensation is presented. Risk-averse managers are simulated, and shown to adopt more risk-taking under the influence of stock options. It is also shown that stock options can both help a new entrant compete in an established market; and can help the incumbent firm fight off competition by promoting new exploration and risk-taking. In the case of the incumbent, the stock options are shown to be most effective when introduced as a response to the arrival of a new entrant, rather than used as a standard part of the compensation package. (author's abstract)
OriginalspracheEnglisch
ErscheinungsortVienna
HerausgeberSFB Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2003

Publikationsreihe

NameWorking Papers SFB "Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science"
Nr.101

WU Working Paper Reihe

  • Working Papers SFB \Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science\

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