Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited

Ali Özkes, Remzi Sanver

Publikation: Working/Discussion PaperWU Working Paper

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Abstract

We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in singleton-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness structure these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.
OriginalspracheEnglisch
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2020

Publikationsreihe

ReiheDepartment of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series
Nummer10/2020

Österreichische Systematik der Wissenschaftszweige (ÖFOS)

  • 502047 Volkswirtschaftstheorie
  • 101017 Spieltheorie

WU Working Paper Reihe

  • Department of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series

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