Bank Capital Regulation With Random Audits

Sudipto Bhattacharya; Manfred Plank; Günter Strobl; Josef Zechner

doi:10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00045-8

Bank Capital Regulation With Random Audits

Sudipto Bhattacharya, Manfred Plank, Günter Strobl, Josef Zechner

WU Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien

Publikation: Wissenschaftliche Fachzeitschrift › Originalbeitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Begutachtung

Abstract

We consider a model of optimal bank closure rules (cum capital replenishment by banks), with Poisson-distributed audits of the banks asset value by the regulator, with the goal of eliminating (ameliorating) the incentives of levered bank shareholders/managers to take excessive risks in their choice of underlying assets. The roles of (tax or other) subsidies on deposit interest payments by the bank, and of the auditing frequency are examined. 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved

Originalsprache	Englisch
Seiten (von - bis)	1301 - 1321
Fachzeitschrift	Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control
Jahrgang	26
Ausgabenummer	7-8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00045-8
Publikationsstatus	Veröffentlicht - 2002

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abstract = "We consider a model of optimal bank closure rules (cum capital replenishment by banks), with Poisson-distributed audits of the banks asset value by the regulator, with the goal of eliminating (ameliorating) the incentives of levered bank shareholders/managers to take excessive risks in their choice of underlying assets. The roles of (tax or other) subsidies on deposit interest payments by the bank, and of the auditing frequency are examined. 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved",

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AU - Plank, Manfred

AU - Strobl, Günter

AU - Zechner, Josef

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AB - We consider a model of optimal bank closure rules (cum capital replenishment by banks), with Poisson-distributed audits of the banks asset value by the regulator, with the goal of eliminating (ameliorating) the incentives of levered bank shareholders/managers to take excessive risks in their choice of underlying assets. The roles of (tax or other) subsidies on deposit interest payments by the bank, and of the auditing frequency are examined. 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved

U2 - 10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00045-8

DO - 10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00045-8

M3 - Journal article

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JO - Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

JF - Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

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