Abstract
We study the role of performance differences in a task requiring cognitive effort on in-group bias. We show that the in-group bias is strong in groups consisting of high-performing members, and it is weak in low-performing groups. This holds although high-performing subjects exhibit no in-group bias as members of minimal groups, whereas low-performing subjects strongly do. We also observe instances of low-performing subjects punishing the in-group favoritism of low-performing peers. The same does not occur in high-performing or minimal groups where subjects generally accept that decisions are in-group biased.
Originalsprache | Englisch |
---|---|
Seiten (von - bis) | 280 - 292 |
Fachzeitschrift | Journal of Public Economics |
Jahrgang | 167 |
DOIs | |
Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2018 |
Österreichische Systematik der Wissenschaftszweige (ÖFOS)
- 502010 Finanzwissenschaft
- 502027 Politische Ökonomie
- 502024 Öffentliche Wirtschaft