TY - UNPB
T1 - Could Country-by-Country Reporting Increase Profit Shifting?
AU - Doeleman, Ruby
AU - Langenmayr, Dominika
AU - Schindler, Dirk
PY - 2024/11/14
Y1 - 2024/11/14
N2 - Since 2016, Country-by-Country reporting has provided tax authorities with detailed information about multinationals’ worldwide activities. It has been hailed as a game-changer for corporate taxation, enabling tax authorities to target multinational firms with high profits in tax havens. We model Country-by-Country reporting as increasing both tax planning and audit costs for profit-shifting multinationals, where the latter costs depend on the share of profits held in tax havens. Then, Country-by-Country reporting makes shifting profits from a high-tax country to a tax haven relatively more attractive than shifting from a low-tax country to a tax haven—a substitution effect. Thus, while the total amount of profits shifted to the tax haven decreases, profit shifting from high-tax affiliates may increase relative to the situation without Country-by-Country reporting. We confirm these changes in profit-shifting patterns using a staggered difference-in-differences design. The opposing effects for low-tax and high-tax countries also help explaining the mixed findings of previous empirical studies on Country-by-Country reporting.
AB - Since 2016, Country-by-Country reporting has provided tax authorities with detailed information about multinationals’ worldwide activities. It has been hailed as a game-changer for corporate taxation, enabling tax authorities to target multinational firms with high profits in tax havens. We model Country-by-Country reporting as increasing both tax planning and audit costs for profit-shifting multinationals, where the latter costs depend on the share of profits held in tax havens. Then, Country-by-Country reporting makes shifting profits from a high-tax country to a tax haven relatively more attractive than shifting from a low-tax country to a tax haven—a substitution effect. Thus, while the total amount of profits shifted to the tax haven decreases, profit shifting from high-tax affiliates may increase relative to the situation without Country-by-Country reporting. We confirm these changes in profit-shifting patterns using a staggered difference-in-differences design. The opposing effects for low-tax and high-tax countries also help explaining the mixed findings of previous empirical studies on Country-by-Country reporting.
KW - country-by-country reporting
KW - profit shifting
KW - anti-tax-avoidance rules
M3 - WU Working Paper
T3 - CESifo Working Paper Series
BT - Could Country-by-Country Reporting Increase Profit Shifting?
PB - CESifo
CY - Munich
ER -