Evolution of cooperation and discrimination in software development

Publikation: Working/Discussion PaperWU Working Paper

Abstract

Software development projects typically involve repeated interactions among several groups of people. This setting seems well suited for an analysis by means of the standard-model of the evolution of cooperation, the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Computer simulations of a population of stochastic reactive strategies show that the existence of intergroup discrimination can be modeled endogeneously as a result of noise due to misperception of the opponent's move. (author's abstract)
OriginalspracheEnglisch
ErscheinungsortVienna
HerausgeberInstitut für Informationsverarbeitung und Informationswirtschaft, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2004

Publikationsreihe

NameWorking Papers on Information Systems, Information Business and Operations
Nr.05/2004

WU Working Paper Reihe

  • Working Papers on Information Systems, Information Business and Operations

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