Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Gary Bolton, Kevin Breuer, Ben Greiner, Axel Ockenfels

Publikation: Working/Discussion PaperWU Working Paper

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Abstract

Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.
OriginalspracheEnglisch
ErscheinungsortVienna
HerausgeberWU Vienna University of Economics and Business
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2020

Publikationsreihe

ReiheDepartment of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series
Nummer01/2020

WU Working Paper Reihe

  • Department of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series

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