Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Gary Bolton; Kevin Breuer; Ben Greiner; Axel Ockenfels

doi:10.57938/00f09b32-475b-4343-9270-4ad63ea04744

Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Gary Bolton
, Kevin Breuer
, Ben Greiner
, Axel Ockenfels

Publikation: Working/Discussion Paper › WU Working Paper und Case

101 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.

Originalsprache	Englisch
Erscheinungsort	Vienna
Herausgeber	WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.57938/00f09b32-475b-4343-9270-4ad63ea04744
Publikationsstatus	Veröffentlicht - 2020

Publikationsreihe

Reihe	Department of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series
Nummer	01/2020

WU Working Papers und Cases

Department of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series

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10.57938/00f09b32-475b-4343-9270-4ad63ea04744Lizenz: Nicht angegeben

Wp2020-01Endgültige, publizierte Fassung, 741 KBLizenz: Nicht angegeben

Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets
Bolton, G., Breuer, K., Greiner, B. & Ockenfels, A., 2023, in: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 32, 2, S. 245-466
Publikation: Wissenschaftliche Fachzeitschrift › Originalbeitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Begutachtung

Open Access

Zitat

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Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Abstract

Publikationsreihe

WU Working Papers und Cases

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Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

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