Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Gary Bolton; Kevin Breuer; Ben Greiner; Axel Ockenfels

doi:10.1111/jems.12512

Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Gary Bolton, Kevin Breuer, Ben Greiner, Axel Ockenfels^*

^*Korrespondierende*r Autor*in für diese Arbeit

Markets and Strategy

Publikation: Wissenschaftliche Fachzeitschrift › Originalbeitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Begutachtung

Abstract

Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.

Originalsprache	Englisch
Seiten (von - bis)	245-466
Fachzeitschrift	Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
Jahrgang	32
Ausgabenummer	2
Frühes Online-Datum	2023
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12512
Publikationsstatus	Veröffentlicht - 2023

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3 Zitationen
1 WU Working Paper

Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets
Bolton, G., Breuer, K., Greiner, B. & Ockenfels, A., 2020, Vienna: WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, (Department of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series; Nr. 01/2020).
Publikation: Working/Discussion Paper › WU Working Paper

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Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

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Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

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