TY - JOUR
T1 - Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets
AU - Bolton, Gary
AU - Breuer, Kevin
AU - Greiner, Ben
AU - Ockenfels, Axel
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.
AB - Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12512
DO - https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12512
M3 - Journal article
SN - 1058-6407
JO - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
JF - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
ER -