Abstract
Voting in multi-issue domains allows for compromise outcomes that satisfy all voters to some extent. Such fairness considerations, however, open the possibility of a special form of manipulation: free-riding. By untruthfully opposing a popular opinion in one issue, voters can receive increased consideration in other issues. We study under which conditions this is possible. Additionally, we study free-riding from a computational and experimental point of view. Our results show that free-riding in multi-issue domains is largely unavoidable, but comes at a non-negligible individual risk for voters. Thus, the allure of free-riding is smaller than one could intuitively assume.
Originalsprache | Englisch |
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Titel des Sammelwerks | Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2023) |
Untertitel des Sammelwerks | May 29 – June 2, 2023, London, United Kingdom |
Erscheinungsort | Richland, SC |
Verlag | IFAAMAS |
Seiten | 2040-2048 |
Seitenumfang | 9 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-1-4503-9432-1 |
DOIs | |
Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2023 |
Extern publiziert | Ja |
Veranstaltung | 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2023 - London, Großbritannien/Vereinigtes Königreich Dauer: 29 Mai 2023 → 2 Juni 2023 |
Publikationsreihe
Reihe | Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS |
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ISSN | 1548-8403 |
Konferenz
Konferenz | 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2023 |
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Land/Gebiet | Großbritannien/Vereinigtes Königreich |
Ort | London |
Zeitraum | 29/05/23 → 2/06/23 |
Bibliographische Notiz
Publisher Copyright:© 2023 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.