Projekte pro Jahr
Abstract
Principal-agent models with multiple agents typically assume that the principal wishes to
<br/>maximize the sum of the agents' achievements (net of the rewards paid to them). But in many
<br/>settings, like R&D, all that the principal "Needs" is that at least one agent will be "successful." We
<br/>identify settings where the principal actually wants agents to refrain from exerting high effort
<br/>in order to save expected compensation. We show that the number of agents can decrease in
<br/>the project's value for the principal. We also consider sequential efforts and investigate settings
<br/>where the principal can provide support to agents.
Originalsprache | Englisch |
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Fachzeitschrift | Managerial and Decision Economics |
DOIs | |
Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2019 |
Projekte
- 1 Abgeschlossen
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Incentives for Multiple Agents
d'Arcy, A. (Projektleitung) & Schmid, C. (Forscher*in)
5/09/16 → 28/02/19
Projekt: Anderes