Managerial Compensation: Linear Sharing vs. Bonus Incentive Plans Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Masako N. Darrough, Neal Stoughton

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Konferenzband › Beitrag in Sammelwerk

Originalsprache	Englisch
Titel des Sammelwerks	Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts
Herausgeber*innen	Amershi, Amin H., Ziemba, William T., Feltham, Gerald A.
Verlag	Springer
Seiten	319 - 347
Publikationsstatus	Veröffentlicht - 1988

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title = "Managerial Compensation: Linear Sharing vs. Bonus Incentive Plans Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection",

author = "Darrough, {Masako N.} and Neal Stoughton",

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AU - Stoughton, Neal

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