Abstract
An intertemporal state-dependent expected utility model - adding up the anticipated flows of utility from wealth and from temporary emotions induced by the resolution of uncertainty - is used to explain procrastinative versus over-anxious demand for health care, both in comparison to the classical expected utility of wealth maximizers behaviour. The emotional expected utility (EEU-)maximizer, balances the marginal costs of delaying a diagnosis (as seen from the pure expected utility of wealth (EU-) maximizers point of view), against
the marginal bene ts of lowering the disutility of anticipated post-outcome disappointment and pre-outcome anxiety. If an EU-maximizer (the cool subject) and an EEU-subject with the same - sufficiently high - rate of time preference have the choice to receive a critical diagnosis and treatment now or later, the EEU-subject will decide in favour of later, while the EU-maximizer prefers now. For low discount rates, however, the EEU-type expresses an even stronger preference for diagnosis now than the cool type. In a state of sickness, the same subject, who was willing to procrastinate in the rst place, can be lured into unfairt herapy bets promising an improbable and delayed success. If the EEU-subject knows that the health status cannot be changed after receiving the diagnosis, not knowing the status will be strictly preferred, while the EU-subject will be just indi¤erent. The model also implies that propagating preventive care should rely on enlightening and not on frighteningarguments, as the latter might raise the attractiveness of procrastination.
the marginal bene ts of lowering the disutility of anticipated post-outcome disappointment and pre-outcome anxiety. If an EU-maximizer (the cool subject) and an EEU-subject with the same - sufficiently high - rate of time preference have the choice to receive a critical diagnosis and treatment now or later, the EEU-subject will decide in favour of later, while the EU-maximizer prefers now. For low discount rates, however, the EEU-type expresses an even stronger preference for diagnosis now than the cool type. In a state of sickness, the same subject, who was willing to procrastinate in the rst place, can be lured into unfairt herapy bets promising an improbable and delayed success. If the EEU-subject knows that the health status cannot be changed after receiving the diagnosis, not knowing the status will be strictly preferred, while the EU-subject will be just indi¤erent. The model also implies that propagating preventive care should rely on enlightening and not on frighteningarguments, as the latter might raise the attractiveness of procrastination.
Originalsprache | Englisch |
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Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 1 Apr. 2015 |
Österreichische Systematik der Wissenschaftszweige (ÖFOS)
- 303010 Gesundheitsökonomie
- 501