Simple scaling of cooperation in donor-recipient games

Ulrich Berger

doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.06.003

Simple scaling of cooperation in donor-recipient games

Ulrich Berger

Department für Volkswirtschaft (Berger)

Publikation: Wissenschaftliche Fachzeitschrift › Originalbeitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Begutachtung

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Abstract

We present a simple argument which proves a general version of the scaling phenomenon recently observed in donor-recipient games by Tanimoto [Tanimoto, J., 2009. A simple scaling of the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in donor-recipient games by various reciprocity mechanisms. BioSystems 96, 29-34].

Originalsprache	Englisch
Seiten (von - bis)	165 - 167
Fachzeitschrift	BioSystems
Jahrgang	97
Ausgabenummer	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.06.003
Publikationsstatus	Veröffentlicht - 2009

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title = "Simple scaling of cooperation in donor-recipient games",

abstract = "We present a simple argument which proves a general version of the scaling phenomenon recently observed in donor-recipient games by Tanimoto [Tanimoto, J., 2009. A simple scaling of the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in donor-recipient games by various reciprocity mechanisms. BioSystems 96, 29-34].",

keywords = "Prisoner{\textquoteright}s Dilemma, Evolutionary game, Cooperation, Donor-recipient game",

author = "Ulrich Berger",

year = "2009",

doi = "10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.06.003",

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AU - Berger, Ulrich

PY - 2009

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AB - We present a simple argument which proves a general version of the scaling phenomenon recently observed in donor-recipient games by Tanimoto [Tanimoto, J., 2009. A simple scaling of the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in donor-recipient games by various reciprocity mechanisms. BioSystems 96, 29-34].

KW - Prisoner’s Dilemma

KW - Evolutionary game

KW - Cooperation

KW - Donor-recipient game

U2 - 10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.06.003

DO - 10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.06.003

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0303-2647

VL - 97

SP - 165

EP - 167

JO - BioSystems

JF - BioSystems

IS - 3

ER -