Uncertainty, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice and the Demand for Health Care

An intertemporal state dependent emotional expected utility (EEU-)model - taking into account anticipated temporary utility utility flows caused by emotional shocks after resolution of uncertainty in addition to expected permanent utility flows of wealth - is used to explain seemingly irrational behavior of patients like delaying a diagnosis in spite of severe symptoms of illness. If the discount rate is sufficiently high (low) the EEU-subject will prefer to delay (speed up) the demand for health care in comparison to the cool EU-subject. However, after getting - incidentally - a diagnosis of bad health, the same EEU-subject, who had been willing to delay, can be lured into unfair therapy bets. Diagnostic fees strengthen the preference for delay. If the health status cannot be changed after getting the diagnosis of illness (Huntingtons dis- ease), not knowing the status will be strictly preferred by the EEU-subject. Propagating preventive care via frightening (rather than enlightening) arguments might even raise the attractiveness of procrastination).