Wage transparency and performance: A real-effort experiment

Ben Greiner; Axel Ockenfels; Peter Werner

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.015

Wage transparency and performance: A real-effort experiment

Ben Greiner, Axel Ockenfels, Peter Werner

Strategy and Innovation

Publikation: Wissenschaftliche Fachzeitschrift › Originalbeitrag in Fachzeitschrift › Begutachtung

Abstract

Without transparency about peer wages in a real effort experiment, a change of wages does not affect performance. With transparency, however, higher paid workers tend to work more accurately, and lower paid workers shirk more under piece rates.

Originalsprache	Englisch
Seiten (von - bis)	236 - 238
Fachzeitschrift	Economics Letters
Jahrgang	111
Ausgabenummer	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.015
Publikationsstatus	Veröffentlicht - 2011

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Zitat

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title = "Wage transparency and performance: A real-effort experiment",

abstract = "Without transparency about peer wages in a real effort experiment, a change of wages does not affect performance. With transparency, however, higher paid workers tend to work more accurately, and lower paid workers shirk more under piece rates.",

author = "Ben Greiner and Axel Ockenfels and Peter Werner",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.015",

language = "English",

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AU - Werner, Peter

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.015

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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