Work Motivation and Teams

Simone Häckl, Rupert Sausgruber, Jean-Robert Tyran

Publikation: Working/Discussion PaperWorking Paper/Preprint

Abstract

We provide a new measure of work motivation and show that motivation shapes the effects of team incentives and observation by peers on performance. In particular, we measure motivation to work hard as the deviation from the money-maximizing benchmark in a real-effort experiment. While we find that average output increases in response to team incentives and observation, we find that highly motivated workers do not respond. The reason is that highly motivated workers already work hard and increasing effort even further is very costly to them.
OriginalspracheEnglisch
ErscheinungsortCopenhagen
HerausgeberUniversity of Copenhagen
Seitenumfang43
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2018

Publikationsreihe

ReiheDiscussion Papers from the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Band18-08

Zitat