@techreport{a43808f4489e4cb6be965cb519c50fe0,
title = "A simulation study of managerial compensation",
abstract = "A computational economics model of managerial compensation is presented. Risk-averse managers are simulated, and shown to adopt more risk-taking under the influence of stock options. It is also shown that stock options can both help a new entrant compete in an established market; and can help the incumbent firm fight off competition by promoting new exploration and risk-taking. In the case of the incumbent, the stock options are shown to be most effective when introduced as a response to the arrival of a new entrant, rather than used as a standard part of the compensation package. (author's abstract)",
author = "Brian Sallans and Alexander Pfister and Georg Dorffner",
year = "2003",
doi = "10.57938/a43808f4-489e-4cb6-be96-5cb519c50fe0",
language = "English",
series = "Working Papers SFB {"}Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science{"}",
number = "101",
publisher = "SFB Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "SFB Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business",
}