Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited

Ali Özkes, Remzi Sanver

Publication: Working/Discussion PaperWU Working Paper

Abstract

We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in singleton-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness structure these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Publication series

NameDepartment of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series
No.10/2020

Austrian Classification of Fields of Science and Technology (ÖFOS)

  • 502047 Economic theory
  • 101017 Game theory

WU Working Paper Series

  • Department of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series

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