Abstract
We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.
| Original language | English |
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| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2021 |
Austrian Classification of Fields of Science and Technology (ÖFOS)
- 101017 Game theory
- 502047 Economic theory