Abstract
Experimental tests of choice predictions in one-shot games show only little support for Nash equilibrium (NE). Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy (PCH) and level-k (LK) are behavioral models of the thinking-steps variety where subjects differ in the number of levels of iterated reasoning they perform. Camerer et al. (2004) claim that substituting the Poisson parameter tau = 1.5 yields a parameter-free PCH model (pfPCH) which predicts experimental data considerably better than NE. We design a new multi-person game, the
Minimizer Game, as a testbed to compare initial choice predictions of NE, pfPCH and LK. Data obtained from two large-scale online experiments strongly reject NE and LK, but are well in line with the point prediction of pfPCH.
Minimizer Game, as a testbed to compare initial choice predictions of NE, pfPCH and LK. Data obtained from two large-scale online experiments strongly reject NE and LK, but are well in line with the point prediction of pfPCH.
| Original language | English |
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| Place of Publication | Vienna |
| Publisher | WU Vienna University of Economics and Business |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2016 |
Publication series
| Series | Department of Economics Working Paper Series |
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| Number | 211 |
WU Working Papes and Cases
- Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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