(De)centralized governance and the value of platform-based new ventures: The moderating role of teams and transparency

Pierluigi Martino*, Tom Vanacker, Igor Filatotchev, Cristiano Bellavitis

*Corresponding author for this work

Publication: Scientific journalJournal articlepeer-review

Abstract

Drawing on institutional and demand-side perspectives, we investigate performance implications of (de)centralized governance modes in platform-based new ventures, and the conditions under which (de)centralization generates more value. Using a sample of 1,431 Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), a new source of entrepreneurial finance, we find that centralization of decision-making is positively associated with platforms’ market value. Further, we consider how platform characteristics affect this relationship, finding that both the presence of an experienced Chief Technology Officer (CTO) and project transparency negatively moderate the positive relationship between centralization and market value. Thus, decentralized platforms need leaders with technical experience and project transparency to generate more value. Overall, this study provides a better understanding of the boundary conditions that increase the value of (de)centralized governance.

Original languageEnglish
JournalSmall Business Economics
Early online date2024
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 2024

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2024.

Keywords

  • Decentralization
  • Demand-side theory
  • Entrepreneurial finance
  • G10
  • G23
  • G30
  • Initial Coin Offerings
  • L26
  • M13
  • Platform governance
  • Platform performance

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