This study examines the determinants of financial firms' lobbying behaviour in the replacement process of International Financial Reporting Standard 4 (IFRS 4) Insurance Contracts. Based on comment letters in response to International Accounting Standards Board's (IASB) Exposure Draft 2010/8, we investigate firms' lobbying decisions and their long-term lobbying intensity. Using an international sample of publicly listed financial firms, we show that insurance companies and financially constrained IFRS firms are more likely to lobby the IASB. We also examine the long-term lobbying activity in the IFRS 4 replacement process during the years 2007-2010. We find that insurance companies and firms with dispersed ownership lobby more. Our results are stronger for IFRS firms compared to US generally accepted accounting principles users. Overall, we document intense lobbying by financial firms and present results that are largely consistent with economic consequences of anticipated accounting changes being the main driver of firms' lobbying behaviour. These results are in line with prior findings for non-financial firms.