TY - JOUR
T1 - Determinants of Ultimate Control of Large Firms in Transition Countries: Empirical Evidence
AU - Gugler, Klaus
AU - Mueller, Dennis C.
AU - Peev, Evgeni
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - We identify the ultimate ownership structures of the 20 largest firms in 12 transition countries in 1996, and the subsequent patterns of ownership change over 1996-2008. Of the state-controlled companies in 1996 more than half are still in state hands in 2008. Better quality of governmental institutions, larger external but not domestic government debt, smaller company size, and higher company profitability increase the likelihood of privatization as well as the likelihood that the company ends up ultimately in foreign hands. We document that, after 20 years, control structure and institutional quality convergence on the West is still largely incomplete.
AB - We identify the ultimate ownership structures of the 20 largest firms in 12 transition countries in 1996, and the subsequent patterns of ownership change over 1996-2008. Of the state-controlled companies in 1996 more than half are still in state hands in 2008. Better quality of governmental institutions, larger external but not domestic government debt, smaller company size, and higher company profitability increase the likelihood of privatization as well as the likelihood that the company ends up ultimately in foreign hands. We document that, after 20 years, control structure and institutional quality convergence on the West is still largely incomplete.
UR - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/mohr/jite/2013/00000169/00000002/art00004
U2 - 10.1628/093245613X13626680790513
DO - 10.1628/093245613X13626680790513
M3 - Journal article
VL - 169
SP - 275
EP - 303
JO - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
SN - 0932-4569
IS - 2
ER -