Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy

Rupert Sausgruber, Axel Sonntag, Jean-Robert Tyran

Publication: Working/Discussion PaperWU Working Paper

Abstract

We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a "dividend of Democracy" in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationVienna
PublisherWU Vienna University of Economics and Business
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 28 Oct 2019

Publication series

NameWU International Taxation Research Paper Series
No.2019-05

WU Working Paper Series

  • WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

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