Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy

Publication: Working/Discussion PaperWU Working Paper and Case

57 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a "dividend of Democracy" in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationVienna
PublisherWU Vienna University of Economics and Business
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 28 Oct 2019

Publication series

SeriesWU International Taxation Research Paper Series
Number2019-05

WU Working Papes and Cases

  • WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

Cite this