Evolution of cooperation and discrimination in software development

Publication: Working/Discussion PaperWU Working Paper

Abstract

Software development projects typically involve repeated interactions among several groups of people. This setting seems well suited for an analysis by means of the standard-model of the evolution of cooperation, the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Computer simulations of a population of stochastic reactive strategies show that the existence of intergroup discrimination can be modeled endogeneously as a result of noise due to misperception of the opponent's move. (author's abstract)
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationVienna
PublisherInstitut für Informationsverarbeitung und Informationswirtschaft, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Publication series

NameWorking Papers on Information Systems, Information Business and Operations
No.05/2004

WU Working Paper Series

  • Working Papers on Information Systems, Information Business and Operations

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