Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Gary Bolton; Kevin Breuer; Ben Greiner; Axel Ockenfels

doi:10.57938/00f09b32-475b-4343-9270-4ad63ea04744

Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Gary Bolton, Kevin Breuer, Ben Greiner, Axel Ockenfels

Publication: Working/Discussion Paper › WU Working Paper

88 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Vienna
Publisher	WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.57938/00f09b32-475b-4343-9270-4ad63ea04744
Publication status	Published - 2020

Publication series

Series	Department of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series
Number	01/2020

WU Working Paper Series

Department of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series

Access to Document

10.57938/00f09b32-475b-4343-9270-4ad63ea04744Licence: Unspecified

Wp2020-01Final published version, 741 KBLicence: Unspecified

1 Journal article

Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets
Bolton, G., Breuer, K., Greiner, B. & Ockenfels, A., 2023, In: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 32, 2, p. 245-466
Publication: Scientific journal › Journal article › peer-review

Open Access

Cite this

@techreport{00f09b32475b434392704ad63ea04744,

title = "Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets",

abstract = "Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.",

author = "Gary Bolton and Kevin Breuer and Ben Greiner and Axel Ockenfels",

year = "2020",

doi = "10.57938/00f09b32-475b-4343-9270-4ad63ea04744",

language = "English",

series = "Department of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series",

number = "01/2020",

publisher = "WU Vienna University of Economics and Business",

address = "Austria",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "WU Vienna University of Economics and Business",

}

TY - UNPB

T1 - Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

AU - Bolton, Gary

AU - Breuer, Kevin

AU - Greiner, Ben

AU - Ockenfels, Axel

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.

AB - Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.

U2 - 10.57938/00f09b32-475b-4343-9270-4ad63ea04744

DO - 10.57938/00f09b32-475b-4343-9270-4ad63ea04744

M3 - WU Working Paper

T3 - Department of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series

BT - Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

PB - WU Vienna University of Economics and Business

CY - Vienna

ER -

Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Abstract

Publication series

WU Working Paper Series

Access to Document

Other versions

Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Cite this