Abstract
Voting in multi-issue domains allows for compromise outcomes that satisfy all voters to some extent. Such fairness considerations, however, open the possibility of a special form of manipulation: free-riding. By untruthfully opposing a popular opinion in one issue, voters can receive increased consideration in other issues. We study under which conditions this is possible. Additionally, we study free-riding from a computational and experimental point of view. Our results show that free-riding in multi-issue domains is largely unavoidable, but comes at a non-negligible individual risk for voters. Thus, the allure of free-riding is smaller than one could intuitively assume.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2023) |
Subtitle of host publication | May 29 – June 2, 2023, London, United Kingdom |
Place of Publication | Richland, SC |
Publisher | IFAAMAS |
Pages | 2040-2048 |
Number of pages | 9 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-1-4503-9432-1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2023 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2023 - London, United Kingdom Duration: 29 May 2023 → 2 Jun 2023 |
Publication series
Series | Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS |
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ISSN | 1548-8403 |
Conference
Conference | 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2023 |
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Country/Territory | United Kingdom |
City | London |
Period | 29/05/23 → 2/06/23 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2023 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
Keywords
- free-riding
- multi-issue elections
- strategic aspects
- voting