Free-Riding in Multi-Issue Decisions

Martin Lackner, Jan Maly, Oliviero Nardi

Publication: Chapter in book/Conference proceedingContribution to conference proceedings

Abstract

Voting in multi-issue domains allows for compromise outcomes that satisfy all voters to some extent. Such fairness considerations, however, open the possibility of a special form of manipulation: free-riding. By untruthfully opposing a popular opinion in one issue, voters can receive increased consideration in other issues. We study under which conditions this is possible. Additionally, we study free-riding from a computational and experimental point of view. Our results show that free-riding in multi-issue domains is largely unavoidable, but comes at a non-negligible individual risk for voters. Thus, the allure of free-riding is smaller than one could intuitively assume.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2023)
Subtitle of host publicationMay 29 – June 2, 2023, London, United Kingdom
Place of PublicationRichland, SC
PublisherIFAAMAS
Pages2040-2048
Number of pages9
ISBN (Print)978-1-4503-9432-1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2023
Externally publishedYes
Event22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2023 - London, United Kingdom
Duration: 29 May 20232 Jun 2023

Publication series

SeriesProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
ISSN1548-8403

Conference

Conference22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2023
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityLondon
Period29/05/232/06/23

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • free-riding
  • multi-issue elections
  • strategic aspects
  • voting

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