Abstract
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process where citizens jointly decide on how to allocate public funds to indivisible projects. In this work, we focus on PB processes where citizens may provide additional money to projects they want to see funded. We introduce a formal framework for this kind of PB with donations. Our framework also allows for diversity constraints, meaning that each project belongs to one or more types, and there are lower and upper bounds on the number of projects of the same type that can be funded. We propose three general classes of methods for aggregating the citizens' preferences in the presence of donations and analyze their axiomatic properties. Furthermore, we investigate the computational complexity of determining the outcome of a PB process with donations and of finding a citizen's optimal donation strategy.
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 36th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
| Subtitle of host publication | AAAI-22 Technical Tracks 9 |
| Place of Publication | Palo Alto, California |
| Publisher | AAAI Press |
| Pages | 9323-9330 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 978-1-57735-876-3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 30 Jun 2022 |
| Externally published | Yes |
| Event | 36th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2022 - Virtual, Online Duration: 22 Feb 2022 → 1 Mar 2022 |
Publication series
| Series | Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
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| Number | 9 |
| Volume | 36 |
| ISSN | 2159-5399 |
Conference
| Conference | 36th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2022 |
|---|---|
| City | Virtual, Online |
| Period | 22/02/22 → 1/03/22 |
Bibliographical note
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