Revisiting gender differences in ultimatum bargaining: experimental evidence from the US and China

Shuwen Li, Xiangdong Qin, Daniel Houser

Publication: Scientific journalJournal articlepeer-review

Abstract

We report results from a replication of Solnick (Econ Inq 39(2):189, 2001), which finds using an ultimatum game that, in relation to males, more is demanded from female proposers and less is offered to female responders. We conduct Solnick’s (2001) game using participants from a large US university and a large Chinese university. We find little evidence of gender differences across proposer and responder decisions in both locations.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)180-190
JournalJournal of the Economic Science Association
Volume4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 5 Oct 2018
Externally publishedYes

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