TY - JOUR
T1 - Sales and Self: The Noneconomic Value of Selling the Fruits of One's Labor
AU - Schnurr, Benedikt
AU - Fuchs, Christoph
AU - Maira, Elisa
AU - Puntoni, Stefano
AU - Schreier, Martin
AU - van Osselaer, Stijn M. J.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - A core assumption across many disciplines is that producers enter market exchange relationships for economic reasons. This research examines an overlooked factor, namely the socio-emotional benefits of selling the fruits of one’s labor. Specifically, the authors find that individuals selling their products interpret sales as a signal from the market, which serves as a source of self-validation, thus increasing their happiness above and beyond any monetary rewards from those sales. This effect highlights an information asymmetry that is opposite to that in traditional signaling theory. That is, the authors find that customers have information about the quality of products that they signal to the producer, validating the producer’s skill level. Further, the sales-as-signal effect is moderated by characteristics of the purchase transaction that determine the signal strength of sales: the effect is attenuated when product choice does not reflect a deliberate decision and is amplified when buyers incur higher monetary costs. In addition, sales have a stronger effect on happiness than alternative, non-monetary forms of market signals such as Likes. Finally, the sales-as-signal effect is more pronounced when individuals sell their self-made (vs. other-made) products and affects individuals’ happiness beyond the happiness gained from producing.
AB - A core assumption across many disciplines is that producers enter market exchange relationships for economic reasons. This research examines an overlooked factor, namely the socio-emotional benefits of selling the fruits of one’s labor. Specifically, the authors find that individuals selling their products interpret sales as a signal from the market, which serves as a source of self-validation, thus increasing their happiness above and beyond any monetary rewards from those sales. This effect highlights an information asymmetry that is opposite to that in traditional signaling theory. That is, the authors find that customers have information about the quality of products that they signal to the producer, validating the producer’s skill level. Further, the sales-as-signal effect is moderated by characteristics of the purchase transaction that determine the signal strength of sales: the effect is attenuated when product choice does not reflect a deliberate decision and is amplified when buyers incur higher monetary costs. In addition, sales have a stronger effect on happiness than alternative, non-monetary forms of market signals such as Likes. Finally, the sales-as-signal effect is more pronounced when individuals sell their self-made (vs. other-made) products and affects individuals’ happiness beyond the happiness gained from producing.
U2 - 10.1177/00222429211064263
DO - 10.1177/00222429211064263
M3 - Journal article
SN - 0022-2429
VL - 86
SP - 40
EP - 58
JO - Journal of Marketing
JF - Journal of Marketing
IS - 3
ER -