TY - UNPB
T1 - Social Preferences and Voting on Reform: An Experimental Study
AU - Paetzel, Fabian
AU - Sausgruber, Rupert
AU - Traub, Stefan
PY - 2014/4/1
Y1 - 2014/4/1
N2 - Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for the routine business of democratic institutions. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) hold that anti-reform bias can be attributed to individual-specific uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses resulting from a reform. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate that anti-reform bias arising from uncertainty is mitigated by social preferences. We show that, paradoxically, many who stand to lose from reforms vote in favor because they value efficiency, while many who will potentially gain from reforms oppose them due to inequality aversion.
AB - Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for the routine business of democratic institutions. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) hold that anti-reform bias can be attributed to individual-specific uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses resulting from a reform. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate that anti-reform bias arising from uncertainty is mitigated by social preferences. We show that, paradoxically, many who stand to lose from reforms vote in favor because they value efficiency, while many who will potentially gain from reforms oppose them due to inequality aversion.
UR - http://www.wu.ac.at/economics/forschung
U2 - 10.57938/45b74e53-49ec-4790-892c-a2fea5eb9213
DO - 10.57938/45b74e53-49ec-4790-892c-a2fea5eb9213
M3 - WU Working Paper and Case
T3 - Department of Economics Working Paper Series
BT - Social Preferences and Voting on Reform: An Experimental Study
PB - WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
CY - Vienna
ER -