The impact of powerful authorities and trustful tax payers: Evidence for the extended slippery slope framework from Austria, Finland and Hungary

Katharina Gangl, Eva Hofmann, Barbara Hartl, Mihaly Berkics

Publication: Scientific journalJournal articlepeer-review

Abstract

Tax authorities utilize a wide range of instruments to motivate
honest taxpaying ranging from strict audits to fair procedures or
personalized support, differing from country to country. However,
little is known about how these different instruments and
taxpayers' trust influence the generation of interaction climates
between tax authorities and taxpayers, motivations to comply,
and particularly, tax compliance. The present research examines
the extended slippery slope framework (eSSF), which distinguishes
tax authorities' instruments into different qualities of power of
authority (coercive and legitimate) and trust in authorities (reasonbased
and implicit), to shed light on the effect of differences
between power and trust. We test eSSF assumptions with survey
data from taxpayers from three culturally different countries (N =
700) who also vary concerning their perceptions of power, trust,
interaction climates, and tax motivations. Results support
assumptions of the eSSF. Across all countries, the relation of
coercive power and tax compliance was mediated by implicit
trust, which leads to an antagonistic climate and enforced
motivation. The connection from legitimate power to tax
compliance is partially mediated by reason-based trust. The
relationship between implicit trust and tax compliance is
mediated by a confidence climate and committed cooperation.
Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
Original languageEnglish
JournalPolicy Studies
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Austrian Classification of Fields of Science and Technology (ÖFOS)

  • 502019 Marketing
  • 501003 Occupational psychology
  • 501006 Experimental psychology
  • 501021 Social psychology
  • 501015 Organisational psychology

Cite this