Dynamic Spillovers of Oil Price Shocks and Policy Uncertainty

Antonakakis, Nikolaos; Chatziantoniou, Ioannis; Filis, George

Published: 01/02/2014

Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Link to publication

Citation for published version (APA):
Dynamic Spillovers of Oil Price Shocks and Policy Uncertainty

Nikolaos Antonakakis
Ioannis Chatziantoniou
George Filis

February 2014
Dynamic Spillovers of Oil Price Shocks and Policy Uncertainty

Nikolaos Antonakakis\textsuperscript{a,b,}\textsuperscript{*}, Ioannis Chatziantoniou\textsuperscript{b}, George Filis\textsuperscript{c}

\textsuperscript{a}Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, Institute for International Economics, Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020, Vienna, Austria.
\textsuperscript{b}University of Portsmouth, Department of Economics and Finance, Portsmouth Business School, Portland Street, Portsmouth, PO1 3DE, United Kingdom
\textsuperscript{c}Bournemouth University, Accounting, Finance and Economics Department, 89 Holdenhurst Road, Bournemouth, Dorset, BH8 8EB, United Kingdom

Abstract

This study examines the dynamic relationship between changes in oil prices and the economic policy uncertainty index for a sample of both net oil–exporting and net oil–importing countries over the period 1997:01–2013:06. To achieve that, we extend the Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) dynamic spillover index using structural decomposition. The results reveal that economic policy uncertainty (oil price shocks) responds negatively to aggregate demand oil price shocks (economic policy uncertainty shocks). Furthermore, during the Great Recession of 2007–2009, total spillovers increase considerably, reaching unprecedented heights. Moreover, in net terms, economic policy uncertainty becomes the dominant transmitter of shocks between 1997 and 2009, while in the post–2009 period there is a significant role for supply–side and oil specific demand shocks, as net transmitters of spillover effects. These results are important for policy makers, as well as, investors interested in the oil market.

Keywords: Policy uncertainty, Oil price shock, Spillover index, Structural Vector Autoregression, Variance Decomposition, Impulse Response Function

JEL codes: C32; C51; E31; E60; Q41; Q43; Q48

1. Introduction

This paper addresses an important question, which has recently emerged in the economic literature; that is, the relationship between oil prices and economic policy uncertainty. In particular, the aim of this paper is to examine spillovers between Brent crude oil prices and the Baker et al. (2013) economic policy uncertainty. To achieve that, we extend the spillover index approach by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012), using structural decomposition rather than Choleski decomposition (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009) or generalized forecast error variance decomposition (Diebold...
and Yilmaz, 2012). Furthermore, in order to generate more informative results, we disentangle oil price shocks according to their origin (i.e. supply–side shocks, aggregate demand shocks and oil specific demand shocks), as in Kilian and Park (2009), and we then investigate the spillover effects between these disaggregated shocks and the economic policy uncertainty indices. The countries under investigation are the US, Canada, China, the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, as well as, the aggregate Europe. The study uses monthly data over the period 1997:01–2013:06. The choice of countries, as well as, the sample period is governed by the data availability of the economic policy uncertainty indices.

This study builds on the work of Kang and Ratti (2013) who examine the effects of oil price shocks on economic policy uncertainty in the US, using a Structural VAR framework. They find that positive aggregate demand shocks exercise a significant negative effect on policy uncertainty, whereas oil specific demand shocks have the opposite effect. Furthermore, supply–side shocks do not seem to exert any effect.

In order to examine the spillover effects between oil prices (or their shocks) and economic policy uncertainty, first we need to explain their causal relationship. We argue that bidirectional relationship between oil prices and economic policy uncertainty exists, and therefore we posit the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1**: Increases in oil prices raise economic policy uncertainty. In particular, we postulate that negative effects of oil prices on economic activity and inflation put additional pressure on policy decision making, which ultimately leads to increased economic policy uncertainty.

**Hypothesis 2**: Economic policy uncertainty also affects oil prices. Specifically, policy decisions have a direct effect on firm investment and production decisions, which further impact demand for oil and thus its price.

To elaborate further, we start our analysis with the investigation of the effects of oil prices on economic policy. Since the seminal paper by Hamilton (1983), mounting empirical evidence indicates that oil prices exercise a strong negative influence on the economy. More specifically, past evidence suggest that there are significant effects of oil prices on industrial production and inflation (see, *inter alia*, Filis and Chatziantoniou, 2013; Balke et al., 2010; Tang et al., 2010; Du et al., 2010; Filis, 2010; Peter Ferderer, 1997). Furthermore, authors such as, Rahman and Serletis (2011), Elder and Serletis (2010), Cologni and Manera (2008), Cunado and Pérez de Gracia (2005), Lee et al. (1995) and Hamilton (1983) confirm that the US economic activity has been significantly affected by rises in the oil prices, as well as, by the uncertainty about future oil price changes. Along similar lines, Montoro (2012) and Natal (2012) also establish the link between increased inflation and low production output given an oil price increase. As it is understood, this trade-off raises the concerns of and creates pressure to the policymakers with regard to choosing the most appropriate response towards these oil price effects. A much earlier study by Gelb (1988) provides a more direct relationship between oil prices and economic policy, by showing that increased oil prices cause a rise in federal government purchases. Furthermore, a recent study by El Anshasy and Bradley (2012) which focuses on oil exporting economies, suggests that higher oil prices increase the government size, which it turn, raises concerns regarding its efficient operation.

We further our analysis by focusing on the effects of economic policy on oil prices. Economic policy decisions have an immediate effect on economic activity. For example, Bloom (2009) emphasises the effects of economic policy uncertainty on the business cycle. Antonakakis et al. (2013) find
that aggregate demand oil price shocks and US recessions affect negatively dynamic correlations of stock market returns, implied volatility and policy uncertainty. Furthermore, uncertainty pertaining to economic policy decisions, regardless of its origin (i.e. whether the uncertainty originates from potential fiscal or monetary policy decisions), discourages firms’ investing activity not only because firms are uncertain about future aggregate demand but also because it puts upward pressure on financing costs (see, among others, Pástor and Veronesi, 2012, 2013; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2011; Byrne and Davis, 2004). As expected, lower investment levels will lead to reduced demand for oil, pushing its price downwards. Malliaris and Malliaris (2013) also maintain that inflationary pressures exercise a significant impact on oil prices.

All that said, the aforementioned studies do not distinguish between the various types of oil price shocks. Several authors have documented the significance of disentangling oil price shocks in order to assess their true impact on the economy (see, among others, Degiannakis et al., 2014; Baumeister and Peersman, 2013; Lippi and Nobili, 2012; Kilian and Lewis, 2011; Filis et al., 2011; Kilian and Park, 2009). The pioneers of the notion of oil price shocks are Hamilton (2009a,b) and Kilian (2009b). In particular, Hamilton (2009a,b) identifies two oil price shocks, that is; demand–side oil price shocks, which originate from changes in aggregate demand, and supply–side oil price shocks, which originate from changes in oil production. Kilian (2009b) further disentangles demand–side shocks into two components, i.e. aggregate demand shocks (similar to the Hamilton (2009a,b) classification) and oil specific demand shocks, which are related to the uncertainty of the future availability of oil.

Having established the potential relationship between economic policy uncertainty and oil, this study assesses spillover effects between oil prices (or their shocks) and the economic policy uncertainty. We make an important contribution to the existing literature as (i) this study is the first to examines time-varying spillover effects between oil prices and economic policy uncertainty, (ii) it investigates both the effects of oil prices and oil price shocks and (iii) it adds to the limited number of studies pertaining to Baker et al. (2013) economic policy uncertainty index.

Our findings suggest that according to the impulse response function analysis, there is a negative response from both policy uncertainty and changes in oil prices to respective shocks from each variable. Classifying oil price shocks into supply–side, aggregate demand and oil specific demand shocks, we report that economic policy uncertainty responds only to aggregate demand shocks (negatively), whereas all three types of shocks are negatively influenced by policy uncertainty innovations. Furthermore, time-varying total spillovers between economic policy uncertainty and changes in oil prices range between 10%–25% in the pre–2007 period. During the Great Recession of 2007–2009 we observe a significant peak in spillovers, which ranges between 40%–50%, depending on the country. When we disentangle oil price shocks, then total spillovers significantly increase, reaching even the level of 75%. Net–spillovers suggest that the main transmitter of shocks is the economic policy uncertainty up until the end of the Great Recession of 2007–2009, while in the years that followed it is the changes in oil prices that assume this role. Once we disaggregate oil price shocks into their three components, we observe that all variables can be either net transmitters or net recipients of spillover shocks, depending on the time period. Finally, results are qualitative similar for both net oil–exporters and net oil–importers.

Overall, the findings suggest that unless we disentangle oil price shocks and proceed with a time-varying framework, we are not able to capture the full dynamics of the relationship between oil and economic policy uncertainty. These results are important for policy makers, as well as, investors, considering the dynamic interaction between oil and economic policy uncertainty.
more explicit it is important for investors to understand that during turbulent periods attention should be drawn to economic policy uncertainty, considering the fact that the latter affects the market in which they operate. On the other hand, policy makers should be cautious when formulating macroeconomic policies at relatively tranquil times, as oil price shocks could undermine the successful outcomes of these policies.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology and describes the data. Section 3 presents the empirical findings, and Section 4 summarises and concludes the paper.

2. Empirical Methodology and Data

2.1. Spillover methodology

The spillover index approach introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) builds on the seminal work on VAR models by Sims (1980) and the well-known notion of variance decompositions. It allows an assessment of the contributions of shocks to variables to the forecast error variances of both the respective and the other variables of the model. Using rolling-window estimation, the evolution of spillover effects can be traced over time and illustrated by spillover plots. Starting point for the analysis is the following $p$–order, $N$–variable VAR

$$y_t = \sum_{i=1}^{P} \Theta_i y_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t$$

where $y_t = (y_{1t}, y_{2t}, \ldots, y_{Nt})$ is a $N \times 1$ vector of $N$ endogenous variables, $\Theta_i$, $i = 1, \ldots, P$, are $N \times N$ parameter matrices and $\varepsilon_t \sim (0, \Sigma)$ is a $N \times 1$ vector of disturbances that are independently distributed over time; $t = 1, \ldots, T$ is the time index and $n = 1, \ldots, N$ is the variable index.

Key to the dynamics of the system is the moving average representation of model (1), which is given by $y_t = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} A_j \varepsilon_{t-j}$, where the $N \times N$ coefficient matrices $A_j$ are recursively defined as $A_j = \Theta_1 A_{j-1} + \Theta_2 A_{j-2} + \ldots + \Theta_p A_{j-p}$, where $A_0$ is the $N \times N$ identity matrix and $A_j = 0$ for $j < 0$.

Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) use Cholesky decomposition, which yields variance decompositions dependent on the ordering of the variables, whereas Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) extend the Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) model, using the generalized VAR framework of Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), in which variance decompositions are invariant to the order of the variables. Both models yield an $N \times N$ matrix $\phi(H) = [\phi_{ij}(H)]_{i,j=1,\ldots,N}$, where each entry gives the contribution of variable $j$ to the forecast error variance of variable $i$. The main diagonal elements contain the (own) contributions of shocks to the variable $i$ to its own forecast error variance, the off-diagonal elements show the (cross) contributions of the other variables $j$ to the forecast error variance of variable $i$.

Since the own– and cross–variable variance contribution shares do not sum to one under the generalized decomposition, i.e., $\sum_{j=1}^{N} \phi_{ij}(H) \neq 1$, each entry of the variance decomposition matrix is normalized by its row sum, such that

$$\tilde{\phi}_{ij}(H) = \frac{\phi_{ij}(H)}{\sum_{j=1}^{N} \phi_{ij}(H)}$$

with $\sum_{j=1}^{N} \tilde{\phi}_{ij}(H) = 1$ and $\sum_{i,j=1}^{N} \tilde{\phi}_{ij}(H) = N$ by construction.
This ultimately allows to define a total (volatility) spillover index, which is given by

\[ TS(H) = \sum_{i,j=1,i \neq j}^{N} \tilde{\phi}_{ij}(H) \times 100 = \frac{\sum_{i,j=1,i \neq j}^{N} \tilde{\phi}_{ij}(H)}{N} \times 100 \]  

which gives the average contribution of spillovers from shocks to all (other) variables to the total forecast error variance.

This approach is quite flexible and allows to obtain a more differentiated picture by considering directional spillovers: Specifically, the directional spillovers received by variable \( i \) from all other variables \( j \) are defined as

\[ DS_{i \leftarrow j}(H) = \sum_{j=1,j \neq i}^{N} \tilde{\phi}_{ij}(H) \times 100 = \frac{\sum_{j=1,j \neq i}^{N} \tilde{\phi}_{ij}(H)}{N} \times 100 \]  

and the directional spillovers transmitted by variable \( i \) to all other variables \( j \) as

\[ DS_{i \rightarrow j}(H) = \sum_{j=1,j \neq i}^{N} \tilde{\phi}_{ji}(H) \times 100 = \frac{\sum_{j=1,j \neq i}^{N} \tilde{\phi}_{ji}(H)}{N} \times 100. \]

Notice that the set of directional spillovers provides a decomposition of total spillovers into those coming from (or to) a particular source.

By subtracting Equation (4) from Equation (5) the net spillovers from variable \( i \) to all other variables \( j \) are obtained as

\[ NS_{i}(H) = DS_{i \rightarrow j}(H) - DS_{i \leftarrow j}(H), \]

providing information on whether a variable is a receiver or transmitter of shocks in net terms. Put differently, Equation (6) provides summary information about how much each variable contributes to the volatility in other variables, in net terms.

Finally, the net pairwise spillovers can be calculated as

\[ NPS_{ij}(H) = \frac{\tilde{\phi}_{ji}(H) - \tilde{\phi}_{ij}(H)}{\sum_{i,m=1}^{N} \phi_{im}(H)} \times 100 \]

The net pairwise volatility spillover between variables \( i \) and \( j \) is simply the difference between the gross volatility shocks transmitted from variable \( i \) to variable \( j \) and those transmitted from \( j \) to \( i \).

The spillover index approach provides measures of the intensity of interdependence across countries and variables and allows a decomposition of spillover effects by source and recipient.

The key innovation and contribution in this study is that, instead of using Cholesky or Generalised variance decomposition, so as to obtain the total, directional and net spillover indexes, we adopt a Structural variance decomposition methodology, as it allows the identification of oil price shocks. The choice of structural variance decomposition is predicated upon our empirical exercise. That is, to examine the effects of oil price shocks on economic policy uncertainty. In particular, we disaggregate oil price shocks based on the framework of Kilian and Park (2009). Essentially, with the use of a Structural VAR (SVAR) model, we distinguish between three types of oil price...
shocks; namely, supply–side shocks (SS), aggregate demand demand (ADS), as well as, oil specific shocks (OSS); and by including the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013) in the SVAR, we assess the effects of oil price shocks on economic policy uncertainty. The first type of shock is typically associated with changes in world oil production, whereas the second and the third type of shocks relate to changes in global economic activity and to concerns regarding the future availability of oil, respectively.

For the general case of a $p$–order Structural VAR model, we obtain the following standard representation:

$$A_0 y_t = c_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{p} A_i y_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t \hspace{1cm} (8)$$

where, $y_t$ is a $[N \times 1]$ vector of endogenous variables. In this paper, first, $N=2$ when we assess the relationship between oil price returns and economic policy uncertainty. For the relationship among the three oil price shocks and economic policy uncertainty, $N=4$, containing world oil production, the global economic activity index, real oil price returns and the economic policy uncertainty index, noting that the order of the variables is important. $A_0$ represents the $[N \times N]$ contemporaneous matrix, $A_i$ are $[N \times N]$ autoregressive coefficient matrices, $\varepsilon_t$ is a $[N \times 1]$ vector of structural disturbances, assumed to have zero covariance and be serially uncorrelated. The covariance matrix of the structural disturbances takes the following form:

For $N=2$:

$$E[\varepsilon_t \varepsilon_t'] = D = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1^2 & 0 \\ 0 & \sigma_2^2 \end{bmatrix} \hspace{1cm} (9)$$

For $N=4$

$$E[\varepsilon_t \varepsilon_t'] = D = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_1^2 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \sigma_2^2 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \sigma_3^2 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \sigma_4^2 \end{bmatrix} \hspace{1cm} (10)$$

In order to get the reduced form of our structural model (8) we multiply both sides with $A_0^{-1}$, such as that:

$$y_t = a_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{p} B_i y_{t-i} + e_t \hspace{1cm} (11)$$

where $a_0 = A_0^{-1} c_0$, $B_i = A_0^{-1} A_i$, and $e_t = A_0^{-1} \varepsilon_t$, i.e. $\varepsilon_t = A_0 e_t$. The reduced form errors $e_t$ are linear combinations of the structural errors $\varepsilon_t$, with a covariance matrix of the form $E[e_t e_t'] = A_0^{-1} D A_0^{-1'}$.

Imposing suitable restrictions on $A_0^{-1}$ will help identify the structural disturbances of the model. In particular, for $N=2$ we impose the following short-run restrictions:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{1,t} \\ \varepsilon_{2,t} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \alpha_{11} & 0 \\ \alpha_{21} & \alpha_{22} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{OPS,1,t} \\ \varepsilon_{EPS,2,t} \end{bmatrix} \hspace{1cm} (12)$$

where $OPS =$ oil price shock and $EPS =$ economic policy uncertainty shock.

For $N=4$, the restriction are as follows:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{1,t} \\ \varepsilon_{2,t} \\ \varepsilon_{3,t} \\ \varepsilon_{4,t} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \alpha_{11} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \alpha_{21} & \alpha_{22} & 0 & 0 \\ \alpha_{31} & \alpha_{32} & \alpha_{33} & 0 \\ \alpha_{41} & \alpha_{42} & \alpha_{43} & \alpha_{44} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{SS,1,t} \\ \varepsilon_{ADS,2,t} \\ \varepsilon_{OSS,3,t} \\ \varepsilon_{EPS,4,t} \end{bmatrix} \hspace{1cm} (13)$$
where $SS =$ supply-side shock, $ADS =$ aggregate demand shock and $OSS =$ oil specific demand shock and $EPS =$ economic policy uncertainty shock.

The purpose of the short-run restrictions we impose on the model is to help us identify the underlying oil price shocks, similarly with Kilian and Park (2009). According to the restrictions for $N=4$, high adjustment costs forbid oil production to contemporaneously respond to changes in demand for oil. Furthermore, changes in the supply of oil are allowed to contemporaneously affect both global economic activity and the price of oil. In addition, given that it takes some time for the global economy to react to changes in the price of oil, global economic activity is assumed not to receive contemporaneous feedback from oil prices. However, changes in aggregate economic activity is expected to have a contemporaneous impact on oil prices and this is at large explained by the instantaneous response of commodities markets. Furthermore, it is understandable that oil price developments can be triggered by all types of shocks and in this regard all types of shocks are assumed to contemporaneously affect oil prices. Finally, economic policy uncertainty index responds contemporaneously to all aforementioned oil price shocks.

2.2. Data description

In this study we use monthly data of the economic policy uncertainty indices for Canada, China, EU, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the UK and the US. The series come from Baker et al. (2013). In addition, monthly data have been collected for oil prices, world oil production and the real global economic activity index (GEA), which are used for the estimation of oil price shocks. Data for the Brent crude oil price and world oil production have been extracted from the Energy Information Administration, whereas the data for the real global economic activity index have been retrieved from Lutz Kilian’s personal website (http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/). The period of study runs from 1997:01 until 2013:06. Oil prices and world oil production are expressed in log-returns. Furthermore, oil prices are transformed in real terms. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the series.

As evident in Table 1, economic policy uncertainty indices have comparable mean values, with the exception of Canada and the UK which exhibit the lowest and highest mean values, respectively. Economic policy uncertainty indices are fairly volatile, as shown by the standard deviation, the minimum and the maximum values. With regard to oil price changes, we observe a positive average value, with quite a high standard deviation. Furthermore, none of the series is normally distributed, as indicated by the skewness, kurtosis and the Jarque-Bera statistic. Finally, according to the ADF–statistic, all variables are stationary.

Figure 1 exhibits the evolution of the series during the sample period.

All economic policy uncertainty indices exhibit some common peaks. For example, in all countries we notice an increase in the level of policy uncertainty during the period 2002–2003 (war in Afghanistan and second war in Iraq), the Great Recession of 2007–2009, as well as, during the European Debt crisis in 2011, signifying the increase of policy uncertainty during turbulent economic periods. Finally, the effects of the Great Recession of 2007–2009 can also be observed on oil price changes, which significantly declined in 2009.
3. Empirical Results

3.1. Impulse Response Effects

We begin our analysis by concentrating on the impulse response functions between oil prices and economic policy uncertainty. In particular, we seek to portray not only a narrow setting which merely describes the relationship between shocks in policy uncertainty and oil prices, but also, a broader framework which allows for the introduction of a disaggregated approach towards oil price shocks, and thus considers supply–side shocks, aggregate demand shocks and oil specific demand shocks, separately.

Figures 2, 3 and 4 present the structural impulse response functions of our different specifications of model 8 for a time period of 24–months. The upper and lower error bands with percentiles of 0.16 and 0.84, respectively, are constructed using Monte Carlo integration based on 1000 draws.

Figure 2 reports the structural impulse responses of oil prices to one standard deviation shock to policy uncertainty (left column), and the structural impulse responses of policy uncertainty to one standard deviation shock to oil prices (right column) based on the SVARs with oil prices and policy uncertainty as the endogenous variables for each country.

According to this figure we see that, in general, a surprise increase in economic policy uncertainty shock leads to a very short–lived and statistically significant drop in the price of oil in a window between one and three months. The effect of an unanticipated positive oil price shock leads to a statistically significant decline on policy uncertainty which is more persistent and more pronounced for some countries. The fact that policy uncertainty responds negatively to positive changes in oil prices, is counter–intuitive. The peculiar feature of these results might be masked due to the aggregate measure of oil price shocks. In other words, we maintain that the disaggregation of oil price shocks could provide a clearer picture with reference to the impulse response functions.

Therefore, in Figures 3 and 4, we report the structural impulse responses of supply–side (SS), aggregate demand (ADS) and oil specific demand shocks (OSS) to one standard deviation shock to policy uncertainty (see, Figure 3), and the structural impulse responses of policy uncertainty to one standard deviation shock to supply–side (SS), aggregate demand (ADS) and oil specific demand shocks (OSS)(see, Figure 4). According to these figures, the picture that emerges becomes more clear.

In particular, unanticipated innovations to policy uncertainty do not seem to cause any significant effects on supply–side shocks (SS) before 4 months have passed. At that time we observe a negative and significant response of the supply–side shocks to policy uncertainty innovations. This is suggestive of the fact that positive policy uncertainty unanticipated shocks trigger a decrease in oil production, which is somewhat expected. Furthermore, unanticipated innovations to policy uncertainty lead to significant reduction of aggregate demand shocks (ADS) and oil specific demand shocks (OSS) as reported in Figure 3. The fact that ADS respond negatively to policy uncertainty shocks is explained by the fact that the latter is causing a reduction in aggregate demand, which in turn, drives oil prices at lower levels. In addition, the same response is expected regarding the OSS given that increased policy uncertainty is conducive to lower demand for oil, and thus lower uncertainty about its future availability. These results are also in line with Kang and Ratti (2013).

Turning our attention to policy uncertainty responses to oil price shocks, we find that unanticipated positive supply–side shocks do not exert a significant effect on economic policy uncertainty
(with the exception of Italy for which a significantly positive effect is reported). This result accords with the related literature which maintains that supply–side shocks are no longer important for macroeconomic developments (see, among others, Baumeister and Peersman, 2013; Lippi and Nobili, 2012; Hamilton, 2009a,b). Furthermore, unanticipated positive aggregate demand shocks (ADS) lead to lower levels of policy uncertainty. This is expected as rises in aggregate demand, despite the fact that push oil prices upwards, are regarded as positive information, reflecting booming economic conditions and thus lowering policy uncertainty. This is partly in line with Antonakakis et al. (2013) who find that aggregate demand oil price shocks affect negatively the dynamic correlations of stock market returns, implied volatility and policy uncertainty. Oil specific demand shocks do not seem to trigger significant responses from policy uncertainty, with the exception of Canada, EU and France. Policy uncertainty in France, exhibits a persistent negative response to oil specific demand shocks, whereas respective responses are short–lived for Canada and the EU. This results is expected for Canada given its net–exporting character. Nevertheless, it is counter–intuitive for France and the EU and this deserves further attention.

Finally, we can observe that the negative response of economic policy uncertainty to positive oil price innovations that was reported in Figure 2 is mainly driven by aggregate demand shocks (ADS), which confirms our initial claim that unless we disaggregate oil price shocks by virtue of their origin we cannot attain a deeper understanding of the issue at hand. These results reveal the dominance of aggregate demand shocks, rather than supply–side and oil specific demand shocks, as a source of policy uncertainty innovations.

Insert Figure 3 here

Insert Figure 4 here

Having established the main transmission channels pertaining to the variables of interest, we proceed with the analysis of their spillover effects, which constitutes the main research objective of this study.

3.2. Total spillovers between policy uncertainty and oil prices

Spillover effects between policy uncertainty and changes in oil prices are presented in Table 2. Evidence show a quite low average effect, with the exception of Canada and France, where the average total spillover index is 12.6% and 12.1%, respectively. The lowest score is reported for Italy. Overall, the total spillover indices illustrate that, on average, there is a weak–to–moderate interdependence between oil and economic policy uncertainty for most countries. Average net spillovers for the whole sample demonstrate that economic policy uncertainty is the net transmitter of shocks for China, EU aggregate, Germany, the UK, as well as, the US (see, Table 2). Nevertheless, net spillovers, on average, are relatively small.

Insert Table 2 here

Turning our attention to spillover indices based on the disaggregated oil price shocks (see, Table 3), we observe that total spillovers and net spillovers, increase in magnitude. In addition, it is evident that this magnitude is pretty similar for all the countries in our sample. Moreover, considering all three types of oil shocks, we observe that economic policy uncertainty acts as a net recipient of spillover shocks only in the cases of Spain and Germany, whereas it remains a net
transmitter of spillover shocks for all other countries in our sample (Table 3). It is also worth
noting that aggregate demand oil price shocks (ADS) behave as net transmitters for all countries
but China. This accords with related literature which emphasises the importance of demand–side
shocks, as opposed to supply–side shocks (see, among others, Baumeister and Peersman, 2013;
Lippi and Nobili, 2012; Hamilton, 2009a,b).

Insert Table 3 here

Our analysis so far is based on single fixed parameters. Despite the fact that Tables 2 and
3 show some interesting information, we should not lose sight of the fact that during our sample
period several events took place, such as the was in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Great Recession
of 2007–2009 and the European debt crisis. Hence, the average values presented in Tables 2 and
3 are not expected to hold for the whole time span. Thus, it would be valuable to examine how
these spillovers evolve over time. Therefore we proceed with our analysis by presenting the total
and net spillovers using 60–month rolling samples. It should be underlined that different forecast
horizons (from 5 up to 15 months) and different window lengths (48 and 72) were also considered
and the results were qualitatively similar. Thus, we maintain that the results are not sensitive to
the choice of the forecast horizon or the length of the rolling–windows.

The time–varying spillover indices are illustrated in Figure 5. The dotted line represents the
intertemporal progression of the total spillover indices between policy uncertainty and changes in
oil prices, while the solid line, represents the intertemporal progression of the total spillover indices
corresponding to the relation between policy uncertainty and oil price shocks (disaggregated shocks
in virtue of their origin).

Insert Figure 5 here

Starting with spillovers between shocks in economic policy uncertainty and changes in oil prices,
we observe that for most countries, in the period preceding the Great Recession, total spillovers
fluctuate within a range between 10% and 25%. Furthermore, this range of fluctuation is relatively
stable for almost all countries under examination. The only exception to these findings is France,
in which total spillover shocks, in the pre Great Recession period, reach a high at almost 40%.
During the years of the Great Recession, total spillovers increase considerably reaching unprece-
dented heights during the peak of the Great Recession (i.e. mid–2008 until early–2009). In the
period succeeding the Great Recession (i.e. post–2009) total spillovers return to a stable fluctuation
pattern, realised within the same range as in the pre-crisis period, for all countries with the excep-
tion of Canada. Evidently, for Canada, the post-crisis period is characterised by a higher level of
total spillovers. Turning to total spillovers between shocks in economic policy uncertainty and oil
price shocks, the picture is somewhat different. To begin with, total spillovers fluctuate at a much
higher range (i.e. between 50% and 75%) throughout the period of study. Next, although it is a
fact that during the peak years of the Great Recession total spillovers reach very high levels, one
could not argue that these levels are indeed unprecedented. Finally, with the exception of Spain,
total spillovers appear to revert back to their pre-crisis fluctuation patterns. Interestingly enough,
in European countries, Italy aside, another peak of the total spillover indices is observed in the
beginning of 2011, which coincides with increased concerns regarding the migration of the effects
of the debt crisis from Eurozone peripheral countries to the rest of Europe. The aforementioned
findings constitute an indication that unless we disentangle oil prices by virtue of their shocks,
we are not able to extract all relevant information. However, in order to provide a more in-depth analysis of the results, we proceed with reporting country specific total spillover effects.

In the section that follows, we provide additional information aiming to attain deeper knowledge of the evolution of spillover effects over time in each one of the countries of our sample. We begin by identifying the net spillover transmitters.

3.3. Net spillover transmitters and recipients

By concentrating on net directional spillovers we can deduce whether one of the variables is either a net transmitter or a net receiver of spillover effects within a particular country. Initially we investigate the spillover effects between policy uncertainty and changes in oil prices. Results are shown in Figure 6. Policy uncertainty is considered to be a net transmitter when spillovers appear on the negative lower area of each panel.

As can be seen in Figure 6, the early period of our study is characterised by the net transmitting behaviour of policy uncertainty. Although, this does not hold true for France and Italy, where for the most period preceding the Great Recession, oil prices are the net transmitters of shocks. With reference to the Great Recession of 2007–2009, we observe that policy uncertainty assumes an even greater net transmitting role, suggested by the trough of the time-varying net spillover indices. Prominent among the results is that the this trough is observed at different phases of the Great Recession. Stellar examples of this, include France, Germany and the UK. As far as the former is concerned, the net transmitting character of economic policy uncertainty is observed in the early stages of the Great Recession. In the cases of Germany and the UK, it is during the last year of the Great Recession that economic policy uncertainty assumes the net transmitting character.

Furthermore, in the years after 2009, which marked the beginning of the recovery of the global economy, the contribution of policy uncertainty to spillover effects is diminishing (see the upward trend in almost all panels of Figure 6) in almost all countries of our sample. Even more, with the exception of Spain and Italy, oil prices are net transmitters of shocks from 2010 onwards, although their contribution is clearly diminishing during 2012–2013. The latter observation particularly holds for the European countries which experience the consequences of the ongoing Eurozone crisis. The fact that for Spain and Italy economic policy uncertainty retains its net transmitting character, even after the Great Recession, can be explained by the strong economic impact that the Eurozone crisis exerted on these two countries. Thus, we maintain that at times of economic turbulence, oil prices are the net recipients of shocks, suggesting that they are influenced by the policy uncertainty which emerges during these periods.

In order to gain a clearer perception of the situation, we proceed with our analysis by presenting net spillovers between policy uncertainty and oil price shocks. This information is presented in Figures 7, 8 and 9. Each country is associated with three panels while each panel represents one of the three possible types of oil price shocks, as these were earlier defined in the study. As before, policy uncertainty is considered to be a net transmitter of spillover effects every time the net effect (depicted by the solid line) lies within the negative lower area of each panel. We have also included a dotted line which pertains to the results presented in Figure 6, to allow direct comparisons. By so doing, we are able to trace the contribution of each type of oil price shock and produce a more credible interpretation of the results.

**Insert Figure 6 here**

**Insert Figure 7 here**
Results presented on Figures 7, 8 and 9 confirm our anticipation that disaggregated oil price shocks are more informative in relation to the spillover effects between oil and policy uncertainty. More specifically, we notice that spillovers occur between policy uncertainty and aggregate demand shocks, rather than between policy uncertainty and supply–side or oil specific demand shocks. Furthermore, we observe that the magnitude of spillover effects is considerably smaller compared to Figure 6. In order to gain a deeper understanding of these net spillover effects, we proceed with country-specific results.

Starting with Canada (see, Figure 7) the period before and during the Great Recession is characterised by the net transmitting role of economic policy uncertainty, as far as supply–side and oil specific demand shocks are concerned. By contrast, we observe that for the same period, economic policy uncertainty is a net receiver of spillover effects with regard to aggregate demand shocks. Interestingly enough, in Canada, which is a net oil–exporting country, in the years that followed the Great Recession, it is only the oil specific demand shocks that contribute to the forecast error of policy uncertainty, whereas, supply–side and aggregate demand shocks appear to have no effect at all. A potential explanation of this result may lie within the arguments put forward by authors such as Auty and Gelb (2001), Lane (2003), as well as, Afonso and Furceri (2010) who identify a strong link between resource-revenues – such as revenues from oil – and fiscal policy. To elaborate further, Sturm et al. (2009) argue that public finances of resource-abundant countries may exhibit high levels of volatility depending on the whims of oil prices and demand for oil and thus they constitute a major source of uncertainty within the country. This is a very crucial insight as in relatively tranquil times the macroeconomic policy of the net oil exporting country appears to have a strong link to demand-side oil price shocks.

According to IEA (2013) China is the second largest crude net oil–importer in the world. Interestingly enough, Figure 7 reveals similar results for China to those of Canada. Again, we notice that the aggregate demand shocks are the main source of spillover effect on policy uncertainty. Nevertheless, in the latter period of our study, supply–side and oil specific demand shocks assume a net transmitting character. Authors such as Yuan et al. (2008) highlight the strong nexus between oil and economic growth in China and stress the need for the Chinese Government to set up a national policy regarding the accumulation of a strategic level of oil reserves. According to Yuan et al. (2008), future availability of oil is a major concern within China and abrupt rises in the price of oil are generally the source of serious economic concerns, resulting in higher level of policy uncertainty. The necessity for national planning, targeting energy security, has also been brought up by authors such as Zhang et al. (2009) and Ma et al. (2011). In addition, Ma et al. (2012) emphasize the lack of some appropriate national policy with respect to energy resources in general and oil reserves in particular, which could help stave off future energy turbulence and secure a solid path of economic growth. This will in turn ease the formulation and implementation of macroeconomic policies.

We further our analysis with the European countries, which are net oil–importers. In this regard, part of the analysis in connection with China may also apply to most European countries and especially to countries in which oil is a major input of production. To be more explicit, uncertainty regarding both the future level of the price of oil and its future availability could influence their output level. In Figure 7, we can observe that policy uncertainty in the period
that followed the Great Recession was mainly a net recipient of spillover effects transmitted by the supply–side and oil specific demand shocks. Further, empirical findings concerning individual European countries reveal a similar picture (see, Figures 8 and 9). Notable exceptions in these pattern are Spain and the UK. In the case of Spain, policy uncertainty appears to be the main transmitter of spillover effects, throughout our sample period. Although for the period of the Great Recession, both supply–side and aggregate demand shocks exhibit a net transmitting role. As far as the UK is concerned, it is also the aggregate demand shocks that transmit spillover effects to policy uncertainty even in the years succeeding the Great Recession.

Both demand–side shocks are important for Germany, although at different time periods. According to Carstensen et al. (2013) Germany in 2009 experienced one of its greatest economic downturns ever and that according to the author can be attributed not only to the financial crisis per se, but also, to developments in the market for crude oil (see also, Hamilton, 2009a; Kilian, 2009a). Most importantly, Carstensen et al. (2013) provide evidence suggesting that in the short run, despite the appreciation of oil prices due to aggregate demand shocks, an exporting country can enjoy economic benefits due to higher demand for its products. In the longer term, though, reduced domestic consumption, due to inflationary pressures driven by higher oil prices, dominate the economy and could potentially lead to recession. Understandably, this would increase policy uncertainty within the country. Carstensen et al. (2013) put forward the argument that this is exactly what happened in Germany and this is why although the price of crude oil peaked in mid–2008, the German economy did not enter a recession until 2009. This could potentially explain why rises in the price of oil that are related to booming global economic conditions can aggra- vate expectation regarding macroeconomic policy conduct, even in an economy which is heavily export-oriented, such as Germany. It is understandable that the foregone analysis can also apply to the rest of Europe; in fact, it may be even more appropriate considering that all other European countries export much less commodities than Germany.

According to the IEA (2013), the US economy is the world’s top crude oil–importer. As evident in Figure 9, the net spillover behaviour for the US resembles the previous cases, although with some minor differences. More specifically, net spillover effects between supply–side or oil specific demand shocks and policy uncertainty are very close zero for the pre-crisis period, whereas, for the same period, aggregate demand shocks are net transmitters of spillover effects. Notably, from 2009 onwards it is mainly the supply–side shocks that transmit spillover effects to economic policy uncertainty, although a peak in net spillovers deriving from oil specific demand shocks is observed for the latter years of the sample period. Despite the arguments put forward by Baumeister and Peersman (2013), among others, that supply–side shocks have a small role to play in the US economy, as opposed to demand–side shocks, we provide evidence that the former shocks have indeed a role to play in economic policy uncertainty developments.

In retrospect, we find that there is not one single net transmitter of spillover shocks, but rather all variables assume this character at different time periods. This is suggestive of the fact that there is no constant relationship between oil price shocks and economic policy uncertainty and even more this relationship varies with the type of oil price shock. In this regard, claims about the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and oil price shocks, based on static estimates, may not reveal the whole picture and, in cases, they may be misleading. Finally, distinguishing oil price shocks by virtue of their origin and investigating net spillover effects in this disaggregated framework provides a more thorough picture regarding the said relationship. On a final note, it is worth noting that our findings apply to both net oil–exporting and net oil–importing countries.
4. Conclusion

This paper examines the relationship between oil prices and economic policy uncertainty, using monthly data on oil and the economic policy uncertainty index produced by Baker et al. (2013), over the period 1997:01–2013:06. We examine the said relationship by extending the spillover index approach by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) using structural decomposition. In addition, we disaggregate oil price shocks by virtue of their origin following Kilian and Park (2009) classification, and investigate spillover effects between each of these shocks and economic policy uncertainty. Sample countries include the US, Canada, China, the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain and the aggregate Europe.

According to existing literature, it is anticipated that there is bidirectional relationship between economic policy uncertainty and oil prices. On one hand, higher oil prices exert negative impacts on the economy, such as lower productivity and/or higher inflation (see, inter alia, Filis and Chatziantoniou, 2013; Montoro, 2012; Natal, 2012; Rahman and Serletis, 2011; Balke et al., 2010; Elder and Serletis, 2010; Tang et al., 2010; Du et al., 2010; Filis, 2010; Cologni and Manera, 2008; Cunado and Pérez de Gracia, 2005; Peter Ferderer, 1997; Hamilton, 1983). Such economic conditions put pressure on policy makers to mitigate the negative effects of increased oil prices, which in turn, raises concerns regarding the success of these policies. On the other hand, uncertainty surrounding economic policy decisions negatively affects firms’ investment and output decisions (see, among others, Wang et al., 2014; Pástor and Veronesi, 2013, 2012; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2011; Byrne and Davis, 2004). Considering that reduced investment and output levels cause a downward pressure on oil prices, we opine that economic policy uncertainty exerts an impact on oil prices.

Impulse response functions suggest that both economic policy uncertainty and changes in oil prices respond negatively to each others’ shocks. The response from oil prices is expected, given that increased policy uncertainty may lead to lower productivity, and thus lower demand for oil. Decomposing oil price shocks, we observe that changes in economic policy uncertainty causes significantly negative responses from all types of shocks, although there is a delayed response from the supply–sid shocks. The counter-intuitive response of economic policy uncertainty to changes in oil prices can be explained by the contribution of aggregate demand shocks, which is clearly evidenced once oil price shocks are disaggregated. Furthermore, we provide evidence that supply–side and oil specific demand shocks do not trigger any responses from economic policy uncertainty. These results are in line with Kang and Ratti (2013).

As far as total spillovers are concerned, we show that spillovers between economic policy uncertainty and changes in oil prices range between 10%–25% in the pre–2007 period. During the Great Recession of 2007–2009 total spillovers considerably increase reaching unprecedented heights of about 40% to 50%. With reference to the post–2009 period, total spillovers appear to revert back to the pre–2007 fluctuations patterns. Turning our attention to net spillover effects, our results reveal that almost for all countries, economic policy uncertainty is net transmitter throughout the period up until the end of the Great Recession of 2007–2009. In the post–2009 period economic policy uncertainty assumes a net receiving role. This result stands to reason, given that the global economic crisis has ended and thus uncertainty regarding future economic developments reverts to lower levels.

Once we distinguish between the different oil price shocks, we observe that total spillovers exhibit considerably different patterns and magnitudes. Prominent among our results is the finding that total spillovers occur between policy uncertainty and aggregate demand shocks, rather than...
policy uncertainty and supply–side or oil specific demand shocks. Net spillovers among policy uncertainty and the three oil price shocks reveal that any variable can assume either a net transmitting or net receiving character, depending on the time period. In this regard, we maintain that it is important to investigate this relationship in a dynamic, as opposed to a static framework.

This is suggestive of the fact that unless we use a disaggregated oil price shocks framework, we are not in the position to gain a thorough understanding on the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and oil prices. In addition, our results remain qualitatively similar for both net oil–exporting and net oil–importing countries of our sample.

These results are important for policy makers, as well as, investors who are interested in the oil market. To be more explicit it is important for investors to understand that during turbulent periods attention should be drawn to economic policy uncertainty, considering the fact that the latter affects the market in which they operate. On the other hand, policy makers should be cautious when formulating macroeconomic policies at relatively tranquil times, as oil price shocks could undermine the successful outcomes of these policies.

Finally, investigating the relationship between (i) financial sector uncertainty (as this is approximated by stock market volatility) and oil price shocks, (ii) business sector sentiment and oil price shocks, as well as, (iii) consumer confidence and oil price shocks, using a similar framework, could constitute potential avenues for further research.

References


Zhang, X.-B., Fan, Y., Wei, Y.-M., 2009. A model based on stochastic dynamic programming for determining China’s

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, 1997:01 until 2013:06

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Series</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Error</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Excess Kurtosis</th>
<th>Jarque-Bera ADF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAN EPU</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>101.7949</td>
<td>39.5358</td>
<td>43.7017</td>
<td>249.2652</td>
<td>1.0228**</td>
<td>0.6428</td>
<td>28.736***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN EPU</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>109.8563</td>
<td>67.1629</td>
<td>9.0667</td>
<td>263.5231</td>
<td>1.1818**</td>
<td>1.1866**</td>
<td>43.717**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA EPU</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>109.4032</td>
<td>50.3866</td>
<td>36.4004</td>
<td>303.4609</td>
<td>0.6546**</td>
<td>-0.2152</td>
<td>11.003***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER EPU</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>106.2261</td>
<td>35.0111</td>
<td>42.2477</td>
<td>253.0389</td>
<td>0.9681**</td>
<td>1.0793**</td>
<td>30.713***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA EPU</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>108.7657</td>
<td>37.4112</td>
<td>40.0090</td>
<td>243.9464</td>
<td>0.9206**</td>
<td>1.0747**</td>
<td>28.406**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPA EPU</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>104.5135</td>
<td>40.6360</td>
<td>28.3315</td>
<td>241.8103</td>
<td>0.6845**</td>
<td>0.4278</td>
<td>12.857**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK EPU</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>117.4592</td>
<td>66.6526</td>
<td>31.8590</td>
<td>297.4211</td>
<td>0.6553**</td>
<td>-0.8550*</td>
<td>15.300**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US EPU</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>109.8556</td>
<td>38.7015</td>
<td>57.2026</td>
<td>245.1263</td>
<td>0.5250**</td>
<td>-0.5026</td>
<td>8.4691*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU EPU</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>108.5708</td>
<td>34.5199</td>
<td>53.3714</td>
<td>213.5486</td>
<td>0.3745</td>
<td>-0.8731*</td>
<td>8.2701*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆(OIL PRICE)</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>0.0074</td>
<td>0.0065</td>
<td>-0.3109</td>
<td>0.2006</td>
<td>-0.7429</td>
<td>0.9128*</td>
<td>24.964**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆(OIL PROD)</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>-0.0249</td>
<td>0.0259</td>
<td>-0.0600</td>
<td>0.9077*</td>
<td>6.8815*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEA</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>0.0322</td>
<td>0.0202</td>
<td>-0.5025</td>
<td>0.5914</td>
<td>0.1336</td>
<td>-1.0819**</td>
<td>10.2451**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ADF denotes Augmented Dickey Fuller tests with 5% and 1% critical values of -3.44 and -4.02, respectively. * and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 2: Spillover table (1997M01 2013M06)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CAN</th>
<th>CHN</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From (j)</td>
<td>From (j)</td>
<td>From (j)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIL</td>
<td>OIL</td>
<td>OIL</td>
<td>OIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. to others</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. incl. own</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIL</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>90.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. to others</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. incl. own</td>
<td>101.0</td>
<td>103.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>88.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. to others</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. incl. own</td>
<td>101.3</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>92.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. to others</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. incl. own</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>90.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. to others</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. incl. own</td>
<td>101.0</td>
<td>103.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>88.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. to others</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. incl. own</td>
<td>101.3</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>92.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Spillover indices, given by Equations (2)-(6), calculated from variance decompositions based on 12-step-ahead forecasts.
Table 3: Spillover table (1997M01–2013M06)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CAN</th>
<th></th>
<th>CHN</th>
<th></th>
<th>EU</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From (j)</td>
<td>To (i)</td>
<td>From (j)</td>
<td>To (i)</td>
<td>From (j)</td>
<td>To (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>84.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADS</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. to others</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. incl. own</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>104.7</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ESP</th>
<th></th>
<th>FRA</th>
<th></th>
<th>GER</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From (j)</td>
<td>To (i)</td>
<td>From (j)</td>
<td>To (i)</td>
<td>From (j)</td>
<td>To (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADS</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. to others</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. incl. own</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>139.1</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ITA</th>
<th></th>
<th>UK</th>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From (j)</td>
<td>To (i)</td>
<td>From (j)</td>
<td>To (i)</td>
<td>From (j)</td>
<td>To (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>82.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADS</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. to others</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contr. incl. own</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>100.5</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>106.2</td>
<td>106.2</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Spillover indices, given by Equations (2)-(6), calculated from variance decompositions based on 12-step-ahead forecasts.
Figure 1: Time series employed in the study
Figure 2: Structural impulse responses of oil price (policy uncertainty) to one standard deviation shock to policy uncertainty (oil price)

Note: Dashed lines denote the upper and lower error bands with percentiles of 0.16 and 0.84, respectively, and are constructed using Monte Carlo integration based on 1000 draws.
Figure 3: Structural impulse responses of SS, ADS and OSS to one standard deviation shock to economic policy uncertainty

Note: Dashed lines denote the upper and lower error bands with percentiles of 0.16 and 0.84, respectively, and are constructed using Monte Carlo integration based on 1000 draws.
Figure 4: Structural impulse responses of economic policy uncertainty to one standard deviation shock to SS, ADS and OSS

Note: Dashed lines denote the upper and lower error bands with percentiles of 0.16 and 0.84, respectively, and are constructed using Monte Carlo integration based on 1000 draws.
Figure 5: Total spillovers
Figure 6: Net spillovers between policy uncertainty and oil returns
Figure 7: Net spillovers between policy uncertainty and oil price shocks in Canada, China and EU
Figure 8: Net spillovers between policy uncertainty and oil price shocks in Spain, France and Germany

![Graphs showing net spillovers between policy uncertainty and oil price shocks in Spain, France, and Germany for the years 2005 to 2014.](image)
Figure 9: Net spillovers between policy uncertainty and oil price shocks in Italy, UK and US

\[\text{NetSpill}_{ITA,\text{SS-EPU}} \quad \text{NetSpill}_{ITA,\text{OSS-EPU}} \quad \text{NetSpill}_{ITA,\text{ADS-EPU}} \quad \text{NetSpill}_{ITA,\text{OIL}}\]

\[\text{NetSpill}_{UK,\text{SS-EPU}} \quad \text{NetSpill}_{UK,\text{OSS-EPU}} \quad \text{NetSpill}_{UK,\text{ADS-EPU}} \quad \text{NetSpill}_{UK,\text{OIL}}\]

\[\text{NetSpill}_{US,\text{SS-EPU}} \quad \text{NetSpill}_{US,\text{OSS-EPU}} \quad \text{NetSpill}_{US,\text{ADS-EPU}} \quad \text{NetSpill}_{US,\text{OIL}}\]